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PATENT PROTECTION OF MEDICAL METHODS                      
—FOCUSING ON ETHICAL ISSUES—*  
From Current Situation and Problems on Intellectual Property Law, 
Annual of Industrial Property Law, June 2007 
Written by Yūsuke Satō† 
Translated by Jiameng Kathy Liu†† 
Translator’s note: The following is a translation of “Patent Protection of Medical 
Methods—Focusing on Ethical Issues—,” an article written by Professor Yūsuke Satō in 
the June 2007 issue of the Japanese periodical Annual of Industrial Property Law.  In 
Japan, despite the lack of an explicit statutory prohibition, methods of medical treatment 
have never been patentable.  The Japan Patent Office (“JPO”) has rejected patenting 
medical processes on ethical grounds, interpreting that they do not fulfill the statutory 
requirement of “industrial applicability” in the main sentence of Article 29, Section 1 of 
the Patent Act, and courts have been confirming this practice.  In light of recent 
developments in biotechnology, this prohibition is now in question.  Reforms are being 
discussed from the perspective that Japan’s patent system should encourage the 
development of new medical technology.   
In this article, Professor Satō examines the underlying ethical reasons for excluding 
medical methods from patent protection and discusses whether they are appropriate.  He 
compares the treatment of medical methods under the Japanese patent system to that of 
the European Patent Convention (“EPC”), where Article 52, Section 4 explicitly provides 
that medical processes do not have “industrial applicability.”  He also compares the same 
to the United States Patent Act (“U.S. Patent Act”), 35 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. where, while 
medical processes are patentable, Section 287(c) immunizes medical practitioners from 
liability from medical process patent infringements. 
After reviewing a wide range of theories, Professor Satō argues that the ethical 
issues surrounding Japan’s patent system should be viewed from the standpoint of 
whether the patent system could be socially justified and whether it would lead to 
industrial development.  To do so, the elements of “industry,” as well as limitations of 




                                           
* This article includes subsequent findings and is the continuation of the discussion of ethical issues 
in Patent Protection of Medical Methods (1)-(3).   See Yūsuke Satō, Patent Protection of Medical Methods 
(1), 3(1) HITOTSUBASHI HŌGAKU 285 (2004); Patent Protection of Medical Methods (2), 3(2) 
HITOTSUBASHI HŌGAKU 281 (2004); Patent Protection of Medical Methods (3), 3(3) HITOTSUBASHI 
HŌGAKU 283 (2004). 
†
  Dr. Yūsuke Satō is a professor at Iwate University.  He is also the associate director of the Center 
for Regional Collaboration in Research and Education at Iwate University.  Dr. Satō specializes in 
intellectual property law, particularly patent law and copyright law.   
††
  Juris Doctor expected 2011, University of Washington School of Law.  The translator wishes to 
thank the editors and staff of the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal for their linguistic and editorial 
assistance.     
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I. A LEGAL SYSTEM THAT EXCLUDES MEDICAL METHODS FROM PATENT 
PROTECTION—DEFINING THE ISSUE 
A. Introduction 
In legal systems that protect inventions as patents, there is a global 
trend to exclude inventions of therapeutic methods, diagnostic methods, and 
surgical methods (collectively, “medical methods”). 
To describe further, medical method inventions are discoveries or 
inventions of methods for treating, diagnosing, or performing surgery on 
humans (including animals under the TRIPS Agreement and EPC as 
discussed below), which are different from inventions of medical products.  
Larger examples of medical product inventions include medical facilities 
and patient management systems; smaller examples include surgical tools 
such as scalpels, therapeutic medicine, therapeutic devices and tools, 
diagnostic medicaments, diagnostic devices, and other various inventions.  
In contrast, surgical methods include methods of operating on the human 
body using tools such as scalpels, as well as ways of collecting blood 
samples; therapeutic methods include methods for treating humans using 
medical products such as medications; and diagnostic methods include 
methods of collecting various data from the human body by measuring, for 
example, the organs’ structures and functions for the medical purposes of 
discovering ailments and assessing health conditions, as well as judging 
conditions and progression of disease. 
Within inventions related to medical technology, diagnostic devices 
and medications are patentable and protectable, whereas medical methods 
alone are, as discussed below, unpatentable or subject to limited 
enforcement and thus excluded from protection. 
 
B. The Exclusion of Medical Methods from Patent Protection in Each 
Legal System 
 
1. The TRIPS Agreement1 
 
While Article 27, Section 1 of the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”)2 provides that “patents 
                                           
1
 [FN 1] Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”), Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, THE LEGAL TEXTS: 
THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 320 
(1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
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shall be available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all 
fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step, 
and are capable of industrial application.”3  Section 3 also provides that 
member countries “may exclude from patentability diagnostic, therapeutic 




In Europe, the European Patent Convention (“EPC”) 4  Article 52, 
Section 4, Clause 1 (the former EPC law) 5  provides that surgical, 
therapeutic, and diagnostic methods have no industrial applicability, and 
because these medical methods do not meet the statutory requirement of 
industrial applicability (Article 52, Section 1), they are not eligible for patent 
protection.  In 2000 the EPC was amended,6 and Article 52, Section 4 is now 
repealed (the revised EPC law).  However, the deleted provision can now be 
found exactly in its original wording in Article 53, Section (c).  The purpose 
of Article 53 is to list the exceptions to patentability:  Section (a) provides 
for inventions the publication or exploitation of which would be contrary to 
public order and morality; Section (b) provides for biological processes for 
the production of plants or animals; and Section (c) provides for medical 
methods.  
 
3. U.S. Law 
 
Under U.S. law, although no statutory provision prohibiting the 
patenting of medical methods emerged, the practice had long been banned 
                                                                                                                              
2
 Translator’s note: The extent of protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights 
(hereinafter “IP rights”) varies around the world.  As IP rights became more important in trade, these 
differences became a source of tension in international economic relations.  The World Trade 
Organization’s (“WTO”) TRIPS Agreement is an attempt to narrow the gaps in the way these rights are 
protected around the world, and to bring them under common international rules.  It establishes minimum 
levels of protection that each government has to give to the intellectual property of fellow WTO members.  
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1. 
3
 Translator’s note: For the purposes of Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement, the terms “inventive 
step” and “capable of industrial application” may be deemed by a Member to be synonymous with the 
terms “non-obvious” and “useful,” respectively.  See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, at Article 27 n. 5. 
4
 Translator’s note: The EPC is a multilateral treaty that provides a legal framework for the granting 
of European patents via a single, harmonized procedure before the European Patent Office.  See 
Convention on the Grant of European Patents, Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 255 [hereinafter European 
Patent Convention or EPC]. 
5
 [FN 2] Although the current law is still in effect, it has been amended as mentioned below.  For 
convenience purposes, I will call it “former EPC law.”   
6
 [FN 3] Although the amended law is commonly called EPC 2000, it is scheduled to take effect in 
December 2007 due to delays in the ratification process in various countries.  
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under the judicial doctrine known as the Morton doctrine.7  However, a 
period of absolute protection for medical methods began with the 1952 
revision of the Patent Act,8 as if it had created a momentum that acted upon 
the courts to change the case law, and medical methods became patent 
eligible subject matter, with no limitations imposed on the enforcement of 
patent rights on medical methods, as with other types of inventions.  
Nevertheless in 1992, the Pallin case,9 where a surgeon sued other surgeons 
for patent infringement, triggered Congress to amend the Patent Act in 1996, 
leaving behind, after a nearly a half a century, the heavenly period in which 
medical methods enjoyed absolute protection.10  
In [the 1996] amendment, Section 287(c),11  which does not cover 
patents on medical products such as devices, medications and biotechnology, 
was added to provide for the exemption of infringement liability for medical 
practitioners who infringe on patented medical methods. 
Therefore, although current law does not prohibit the patenting of 
medical methods, it provides an exception for medical professionals in cases 
where medical method patents are infringed, thereby limiting the 
enforcement of patent rights on medical methods.  Furthermore, there are 
many exceptions to the infringement liability exemption, thus triggering 





                                           
7
 Translator’s note: The Morton doctrine comes from the 1862 case of Morton v. New York Eye 
Infirmary, 17 F.Cas. 879 (C.C. S.D.N.Y. 1862), where the New York Circuit Court held that the patentee’s 
claimed inention of a procedure for performing surgical operations with the use of ether was unpatentable 
because both ether and the process of inhaling vapors were not new.  Althoug the court’s rationale seems to 
have rested on the traditional rule that no patent may issue for the discovery of a new but analogous use of 
an old product, the case referred to the “natural functions of an animal.”  Id.  This language has given rise 
to the notion that medical and surgical procedures used to treat the human body are not patentable 
processes. See id. at 884.   
8
 Translator’s note:  The Patent Act of 1952 reflects the basic structure of the present law.  The 
1793 Patent Act defined the four classes of patent eligible subject matter as “art, machine, manufacture, or 
composition.”  The 1952 Patent Act replaced the term “art” with “process,” resulting in the current 
language of 35 U.S.C. § 101.  As a result of this replacement, there has been a substantial expansion of the 
subject matter being claimed in issued U.S. patents.  See Act of Feb. 21, 1973, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318 
(codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 101).  
9
 Translator’s note: Pallin v. Singer, 36 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1050 (D. Vt. 1995).   
10
 [FN 4] See generally Yūsuke Satō, A Theme on the Patent Protection of Medical Methods (2), 
55(3) PATENT 31 (2002) (discussing in detail the history and reform of U.S. law related to medical issues).  
11
 Translator’s note: 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (1996). 
12
 [FN 5] See Cynthia M. Ho, Patents, Patients, and Public Policy: An Incomplete Intersection at 35 
U.S.C. § 287(c), 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 601, 641-44 (2000). 
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4. Japanese Law 
 
In our country, the legal treatment of medical methods inventions is to 
not patent such inventions.  I refer to legal treatment because the Patent Act 
does not have provisions that exclude medical methods from patent 
eligibility, and the Patent Office’s examination guidelines 13  state that 
medical method inventions lack the statutory requirement of industrial 
applicability under Article 29, Section 1, and must therefore be rejected.  
This practice has been confirmed in precedent14 and thus can be called case 
law.  
 
5. Classification of Legal Systems 
 
In sum, systems that exclude medical methods from patent protection 
can be divided into two categories:  1) systems that deny patent eligibility 
itself, and 2) systems that recognize patent eligibility but limit enforcement 
of patent rights.  Further, systems that deny patent eligibility can be further 
divided into systems that deny patent eligibility by determining whether the 
claimed invention lacks industrial applicability on the one hand, and on the 
other, systems that deny patent eligibility by explicitly excluding medical 
methods based on special reasons, thereby denying patent eligibility on the 
sole basis that the claimed invention is a medical method.  
In this article, as does Professor Nakayama, I will refer to patent 
systems that limit patent eligibility itself as “upstream systems,” and patent 
systems that limit the enforceability of patent rights as “downstream 
systems.”15,16  Further, the line of thinking that denies patent eligibility based 
on industrial applicability will be referred to as “industrial applicability 
requirement theory,” and the line of thinking that denies patent eligibility not 
                                           
13
 [FN 6] See Japan Patent Office, Examination Guidelines on Patents and Utility Models, 
http://www.jpo.go.jp/shiryou/index.htm (showing that the Guidelines published in December 2000 have 
been amended in August 2003 and April 2005) (last visited Oct. 7, 2010). 
14
 [FN 7] Surgical Nagivation Technologies Inc. v. Japan Patent Office Commissioner, Kōzō 
Oikawa, 1828 HANREI JIHŌ 99 (Tokyo High Ct., Apr. 11, 2002). 
15
 [FN 8] NOBUHIRO NAKAYAMA, INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY LAW PART I: PATENT LAW, 117 (Kōbundō, 
2d ed. 1998). 
16
 Translator’s note: Patent rights do not arise until a patent has been procured from the government.  
Thus, if the issuance of patent is the peak of a river, then patent procurement could be considered upstream 
and patent enforcement could be considered downstream.  The author’s use of the term “upstream system” 
to refer to patent systems that limit patent eligibility and the term “downstream system” to refer to patent 
systems that limit enforceability of patent rights, as adopted from Professor Nakayama, illustrates the 
difference in approach used by different patent systems to limiting patent protection on medical methods.  
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based on industrial applicability but on some other special reason will be 
referred to as “special reason theory.”17  
Based on this categorization, the TRIPS Agreement, the former EPC 
law, the revised EPC law, and the Japanese law are upstream systems, 
whereas the U.S. law is a downstream system.  In addition, the former EPC 
law is based on the industrial applicability requirement theory, but as 
discussed below, this could also be viewed as a mere legal fiction.  The 
revised EPC law is indeed based on the special reason theory.  As for Japan, 
although the official treatment by the Patent Office seems to be based on the 
industrial applicability requirement theory, as with the former EPC law, it 
has been seen as legally fictitious.  
 
C. Objective of This Article 
 
In any event, the various forms of legal systems that exclude medical 
methods from patent protection are based on ethical reasons.  As such, 
ethical reasons are appearing in the patent laws of various legal systems, and 
are acting as obstacles to the patent protection of medical methods.  
However, depending on what the particular ethical reason is, the way 
in which the obstacle arises differs.  In other words, there is an intimate 
relationship between the position of the obstacle on patent protection of 
medical methods and the ethical reason behind it.  
The primary focus of this article is to examine the underlying ethical 
reasons for excluding medical methods from patent protection and determine 
whether they are appropriate.  Next, [this article] will delve into how such 
ethical reasons should be incorporated into the Patent Act, namely, whether 
the industrial applicability requirement theory or the special reason theory 
should be given more weight, keeping in mind whether the legal system is 
upstream or downstream.  
As a roadmap for the comprehension of the systematic positioning of 
ethical reasons in Patent Act, after discussing Europe’s changing case law 
formed by the appeal cases at the European Patent Office (“EPO”), [this 
article] will touch on the arguments observed in the United States and Japan 
                                           
17
 Translator’s note: Patent eligibility can be rejected based on two theories.  The first theory is to 
reject patent eligibility based on the lack of industrial applicability, which is a statutory requirement.  The 
author refers to this theory as the “industrial applicability requirement theory.”  The second theory is to 
reject patent eligibility based on other special reasons.  For example, even if an invention is in fact 
industrially applicable, it could nevertheless be denied patent eligibility due to ethical concerns.  The author 
refers to this theory as the “special reason theory.” 
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(Part II), and then examine the ethical concerns surrounding medicine in 
light of its relationship with the patent system using the recent 
accomplishments of biomedical ethics (Part III), and finally, it considers the 
systematic positioning of these ethical concerns on the patent system and 
touch on the question of upstream and downstream legal systems (Part IV).  
 
II. THE REALITY OF EXCLUDING FROM PATENT PROTECTION BASED ON 
ETHICAL REASONS 
 




Although Article 52, Section 4, Clause 1 of the former EPC law 
provides that surgical, therapeutic and diagnostic methods are not 
industrially applicable, and that statutorily this is based on the industrial 
applicability requirement theory, there are two opposing theories for this 
interpretation.  The “non-industrial medicine theory” seeks to relieve 
medical activities that are non-business and non-industrial from patent 
restrictions,18,19 while the “socio-ethical theory” is based on the ethical and 
public health concern that anyone who wishes to offer medical methods on 
humans (and animals) should not be hampered by patents to use such 
methods.20,21  
Looking at the case law of EPO appellate decisions, it is noticeable 
that the non-industrial medicine theory is powerful in the beginning and is 
later replaced by the socio-ethical theory.  
 
2. The Non-Industrial Medicine Theory 
 
The non-industrial medicine theory probably focuses on the special 
ethics of healthcare provided by doctors since Hippocrates, and considers 
that such activities should not be recognized as an industry from an ethical 
perspective.  According to this theory, the medical industry should not be 
thought of as an “industry,” and therefore any medical activities should not 
                                           
18
 [FN 9] See case G-5/83, 1985 OFFICIAL J. EPO 64.   
19
 Translator’s note: The prefix “G” in note 18 indicates that the case was heard before the Enlarged 
Board of Appeal of the EPO.  See infra note 33.  
20
 [FN 10] See case T-24/91, 1995 OFFICIAL J. EPO 512.  
21
 Translator’s note: The prefix “T” in note 20 indicates that the case was heard before the Technical 
Board of Appeal of the EPO.  See infra note 33.    
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be eligible for patent protection.  As such, the dividing ridge of patent 
protection and exclusion is whether such medical activities can be performed 
by persons other than a doctor, or whether such activities can be used for 
slimming and beauty parlor types of businesses.  Unless the activity satisfies 
both requirements of 1) non-industrial medical activity and 2) exclusive use 
by doctors, the activity should not be excluded from patent protection under 
Article 52, Section 4.  
 
i. Non-Industrial Medical Activity 
 
Whether or not an activity is a non-industrial medical activity is 
determined as follows.  For example, in the 1985 appeal of the Thenoyl 
Peroxide case,22 the Board of Appeal decided that a limited claim on a 
method of using a drug for cosmetic products was eligible for patent 
protection because the use occurred at a beauty parlor, which was an 
industrial use, and in the 1986 appeal of the Appetite Suppresant case,23 the 
Board of Appeal decided that a claim on a method of body beautification, 
which had both cosmetic effects (slimming) and therapeutic effects 
(amelioration of obesity), should not be denied patent protection because of 
the mere fact that it is hard to distinguish cosmetic effect from therapeutic 
effects.  The Board of Appeal also denied the use of such reasoning against 
the patent applicant.24  
 
ii. Exclusive Use by Physicians 
 
If a medical activity is seen as non-industrial because it is performed 
by a doctor, then the activity performed by a non-doctor would no longer be 
non-industrial.  To illustrate this, the Technical Board of Appeal in the 1987 
appeal of the Non-invasive Measurement case25 decided that if the premise 
of Article 52, Section 4, Clause 1 is to prevent the patent system from 
distracting the practices of medical doctors, then only those method claims 
which are to be practiced by doctors should be deemed impossible for 
                                           
22
 [FN 11] Case T-36/83, 1986 OFFICIAL J. EPO 295. 
23
 [FN 12] Case T-144/83, 1986 OFFICIAL J. EPO 301. 
24
 [FN 13] There are also cases that rejected patent protection based on Article 52 Section 4 of the 
EPC.  In a 1990 case, for example, a claim on the use of a composition containing lantern salt for removing 
and cleaning plaque from human teeth was found to inevitably provide both cosmetic effect and therapeutic 
effect (at least in the sense of disease prevention), and because such claim was not limited to providing 
cosmetic effect and required treatment to the human body for the purpose of therapy, the court held that it 
was excluded by Article 52 Section 4.  See case T-290/86, 1992 OFFICIAL J. EPO 414. 
25
 [FN 14] Case T-385/86, 1988 OFFICIAL J. EPO 308. 
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industrial application.  In the same case, the Board of Appeal decided that 
the claimed measurement method was industrially applicable because it 
could be performed without medical knowledge and skills in a commercial 
environment. 
Furthermore, in the 1987 appeal of the Flow Measurement case,26 
where it was decided that a measurement method (claim 1) that used an 
implanted drug dose control unit was eligible for patent protection, the 
Board of Appeal established that the non-commercial and non-industrial 
medical and veterinary activity should not be limited because the doctor was 
not able to use his professional skills to prevent in any way the disease 
prevention, curing, or symptom-alleviation effects offered by the method.  
Similarly, in the 1990 appeal of the Image Information Creation 
case,27 the Board of appeal decided that the claimed method could be used 
without medical knowledge or special skills, and thus should not be 
excluded under Article 52, Section 4.  
 
3. The Socio-Ethical Theory 
 
In contrast, according to the socio-ethical theory, as discussed above, 
Article 52, Section 4 should not prevent the use of medical methods, and 
even if the claimed method is in fact industrially applicable, it is excluded 
from patent protection if it corresponds to a medical method.  
Within EPC case law, this theory peaks in the 1987 appeal of the Pigs 
I case,28 which held that for methods provided under Article 52, Section 4, 
even if the method is industrially applicable, it must be excluded from 
patentability due to policy reasons.  As such, Section 4 vaguely admits that 
industrial applicability is possible for medical methods, and yet by legal 
control from the policy perspective denies its patentability by asserting the 
lack of industrial applicability.  As such, this standpoint is also known as the 
quasi-industrial applicability requirement theory.  
In the 1994 appeal of the Birth Control I case,29 the Board of Appeal 
announced that even if the claimed method satisfies the requirement of 
industrial applicability under Article 52, Section 1, it is nevertheless 
excluded from patentability under Article 52, Section 4.  
                                           
26
 [FN 15] Case T-245/87, 1989 OFFICIAL J. EPO 171. 
27
 [FN 16] Case T-400/87, 1991 OFFICIAL J. EPO 47.  
28
 [FN 17] Case T-116/85, 1989 OFFICIAL J. EPO 13. 
29
 [FN 18] Case T-820/92, 1995 OFFICIAL J. EPO 113.  
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Moreover, in the 1994 appeal of the Artificial Lens case,30 the Board 
of Appeal stated that because the exclusion provision in Article 52, Section 4 
is based on social ethics and public health concerns and aims to ensure that 
anyone wishing to perform medical treatment on humans and animals not be 
prevented by patents from using such methods, [such methods] do not 
require that doctors be the only people who qualify to use the methods.  
Finally, the 2001 appeal of the Biological Sampling Methods case31 
also applied the policy justification for Article 52, Section 4 as announced in 
the Pigs I case.32  
 
4. Conflict Settlement 
 
As discussed above, there are two opposing views in case law, with 
the socio-ethical theory appearing to have gained more power.   However in 
2005, the Enlarged Board of Appeal33 stated that the exclusion of medical 
methods from patent protection for the lack of industrial applicability under 
Article 52, Section 4 is legal fiction, that the lack of industrial applicability 
should not be considered to be the real reason for exclusion, that Article 52, 
Section 4 does not require that doctors or medical practitioners practice the 
method, and thereby put an end to this long lasting conflict.34 
Integrating this trend, the revised EPC law amended the old provision 
that excludes medical methods from patentability based on the lack of 
industrial applicability, shifting to a new provision that excludes medical 
methods from patentability based on special reasons that are separate from 
industrial applicability, thereby allowing a reasonable explanation for such 
exclusion on the basis of social ethics.  Today, Europe has come to settle this 
issue legislatively, and the legal fiction of the quasi-industrial applicability 
requirement theory has become a thing of the past.  
 
                                           
30
 [FN 19] Case T-24/91, supra note 20. 
31
 [FN 20] Case T-964/99, 2002 OFFICIAL J. EPO 4. 
32
 Translator’s note: See [FN 17], supra note 28.  
33
 Translator’s note: In Europe, decisions of the first stances of the European Patent Office (“EPO”) 
can be appealed to the Boards of Appeal.  Although the Boards of Appeal are integrated in the 
organizational structure of the EPO, they are independent from the EPO in that decisions are bound only by 
the European Patent Convention (“EPC”).  There are currently twenty-six Technical Boards of Appeal, plus 
the Legal Board of Appeal, the Enlarged Board of Appeal, and the Disciplinary Board of Appeal.  To 
ensure uniform application of the law, or if an important point of law arises, a question can be referred to 
the Enlarged Board of Appeal, either by a board of appeal or by the President of the EPO.  See EPO 
Homepage—Boards of Appeal, http://www.epo.org/about-us/boards-of-appeal.html (last visited Oct. 7, 
2010). 
34
 [FN 21] See case G-0001/04, 2006 OFFICIAL J. EPO 334. 
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B. U.S. Law  
 
In the United States, Congress introduced Section 287(c)35 in 1996 in 
order to limit the enforceability of patent rights on medical methods by 
exempting medical professionals from infringement liability.  Although this 
amendment was proposed by the Senate, the legislative history reveals that 
the House of Representatives’ proposal was to ban all medical methods 
inventions from patenting.  There was little debate as to which proposal was 
better, but it seems that Congress ultimately adopted the Senate’s proposal to 
limit the enforceability of patent rights because a complete ban on patenting 
medical methods was considered too drastic.  In any case, Congress knew 
something had to be done, and it looked for the solution through 
congressional debate.36  Several regulatory reasons can be found, but a few 
of them are more than twenty years old.  The legislative history is very 
interesting in that it dates back to the patent reform issues of the early 
Twentieth Century37 and contains an extensive discussion of the issue.  
In the United States, there is no statutory requirement for industrial 
applicability, and although stated strongly, the equivalent is the “utility” 
requirement of Section 101. 38   Because none of the following ethical 
concerns would amount to the failure of meeting the utility requirement, 
they can be considered obstacles to patent protection under the special 
reason theory.  
 
1. Rule of Information Sharing 
 
According to the Oath of Hippocrates, physicians have the 
responsibility of providing the best care to patients, and in order to protect 
this principle, doctors must be able to share information among each other.  
This is known as the rule of information sharing.  
A clear illustration of this rule can be found in “The Principles of 
Medical Ethics” published by the AMA39 in 1957.   Section 2 provides that 
“[p]hysicians should strive continually to improve medical knowledge and 
skill, and should make available to their patients and colleagues the benefits 
of their professional attainments.”  The patent system, which allows people 
                                           
35
 Translator’s note: 35 U.S.C. § 287(c). 
36
 [FN 22] See [FN 4], supra note 10. 
37
 [FN 23] Although amendments were proposed in both 1902 and 1903, they were both rejected.  
See id.  
38
 Translator’s note: 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
39
 [FN 24] “AMA” is short for American Medical Association. 
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who hold information related to revolutionary medical knowledge and skills 
to monopolize and exclude others from accessing such information, directly 
runs afoul of the principle of medical ethics and should be discarded all 
together.  
 
2. Increased Healthcare Costs—Preventing the Public from Accessing 
Healthcare 
 
If medical methods were patentable, then the use of such methods 
would require the signing of a licensing agreement.  Consequently, 
physicians would charge a higher rate from patients in order to recover the 
licensing fee.  This would inevitably lead to higher healthcare costs and 
prevent the public from accessing healthcare.  
 
3. Privacy of Patients 
 
If medical methods were patented and such patents were infringed, the 
process of proving infringement or remedy by disclosing which patient 
received the care under the patented medical method would inevitably 
infringe on the patient’s privacy rights.  For example, the U.S. Supreme 
Court ruled that Connecticut’s anti-birth control law (state law), which 
prohibited the use of birth control rather than the manufacture or sale of birth 
control, was a constitutional violation of a couple’s privacy rights.40, 41  
 
4. Autonomy of Patients and Physicians 
 
The respect for autonomy is a very important principle and the very 
first principle out of the four introduced in the standard textbook for 
biomedical ethics—“Principles of Biomedical Ethics”42 by Beauchamp and 
Childress.  Autonomy is the control over one’s own decision; it is the 
freedom from coercion in deciding to act, and is satisfied when one:  1) acts 
intentionally, 2) with understanding, and 3) without controlling influences 
                                           
40
 [FN 25] See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). 
41
 [FN 26] See George J. Annas, Surrogate Embryo Transfer: The Perls of Patenting, HASTINGS 
CENTER REPORT 25, 26 (1984).  In this article, Annas brings up the U.S. Supreme Court case Griswold v. 
Connecticut and argues that the patent (U.S. Patent No. 4,816,257) obtained on the method of surrogate 
embryo transfer (“SET”) violates patient privacy.  
42
 [FN 27] TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS (5th ed., 
Oxford University Press 2001).  See also TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF 
BIOMEDICAL ETHICS (Yukimasa Nagayasu & Norio Tachiki trans., Shōbundō, 3d ed. 1997). 
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that would affect against a free and voluntary act.43  This is also the basis for 
informed consent.  
The existence of a patent system would endanger autonomy.  In other 
words, if a physician holds a patent or a license to a patented medical 
method, his act would be influenced in that he would want to use the 
patented medical method.  If, on the other hand, a physician does not hold a 
patent or a license, his act would also be influenced in that he would avoid 
using the patented medical method.  Such person would thus not be acting 
free of controlling influences.  
 
5. Fidelity of the Physician-Patient Relationship 
 
The Geneva Oath of the World Medical Association states that “the 
health of my patient will be my primary concern,” and imposes a fidelity 
obligation on physicians with regards to their patients.  However, the 
existence of a patent and licensing obligation would place the physician 
under contractual obligation, which would inevitably lead to conflicting 
obligations, where the physician would not be able to meet his fidelity 
obligation to the patient.44   Moreover, the incentive to gain profit from 
patenting would also run afoul of the fidelity obligation.45  
 
C. Japanese Law 
 
The Japanese Patent Office (“JPO”),46 without offering any reason, 
unexpetedly placed “surgical, therapeutic, and diagnostic method practiced 
on humans” in the exception category to “inventions that are industrially 
applicable.”  Consequently, under the patent examination guidelines, it is 
unclear why medical methods lack industrial applicability.  
Judicial decisions provide some clarification.  In the Method for 
Assisting Surgery case,47 the Tokyo High Court emphasized the difference in 
                                           
43
 [FN 28] See [FN 27] BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 42, at 58-59.  
44
 [FN 29] See Gregory F. Burch, Note: Ethical Considerations in the Patenting of Medical 
Processes, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1139, 1152-53 (1987). 
45
 [FN 30] See Joseph M. Reisman, Physicians and Surgeons as Inventors: Reconciling Medical 
Process Patents and Medical Ethics, 10 HIGH TECH.  L. J. 355, Section II.C (1995).  
46
 Translator’s note: The Japan Patent Office (“JPO”) consists of the General Affairs Department, 
the Examination Department, the Appeals Department, and other sections and departments.  The main 
functions of these departments include:  (1) granting adequate rights for patents, etc.; (2) drafting plans for 
IP policies; (3) international exchange and cooperation; (4) review of the IP system; and (5) dissemination 
of information on IP.  These functions provide for the positive advancement of industrial development.  See 
JPO Homepage—The Role of the Japan Patent Office, http://www.jpo.go.jp (last visited Oct. 7, 2010). 
47
 [FN 31] See [FN 7], supra note 14. 
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infringement liability that arises from patents on medical products and from 
medical methods.  For a patented medical product, the existence of the 
product would determine the physician’s ability to use the product.  In other 
words, the existence of a patent on a medical product would not be 
constraining because the physician would use whatever available product to 
continue his medical activity. In contrast, with a patented medical method, 
the physician would worry about whether the medical method he is about to 
practice is patented, and if it is, whether there is a valid license that allows 
him to practice the method, and would undertake medical activity with the 
fear that he may be liable for infringement.  Physicians who treat patients in 
emergency situations should not have to deal with these concerns.  Although 
this is not to say that medical industry is not industrial, practical reasons 
exist for interpreting medical methods as lacking industrial applicability.  
This viewpoint is similar to the EPC socio-ethical theory (quasi-
industrial applicability requirement theory) as discussed above in Part II.A.3.  
However, this viewpoint is also different from the EPC socio-ethical theory 
because it suggests that only physicians need be relieved from the restriction 
of the patent system, whereas the EPO socio-ethical theory suggests that 
everyone needs to be relieved.  
While theories are categorized under the quasi-industrial applicability 
requirement theory because they tend to come from ethics, raise moral 
reasons, and do not view medical industry as non-industrial, there remains 
ambiguity and vagueness because there is nothing more to say about the 
ethical reason behind such interpretation.  
Unlike pharmaceutical inventions that are mainly developed by 
private businesses for profit, because medical methods are developed by 
universities and do not necessarily involve a patenting incentive, it is not 
unreasonable to say that such development is non-industrial. 48   
Consequently, some interpret the patenting of medical methods in ways 
similar to the non-industrial medicine theory and the industrial applicability 
requirement theory.  
 
III. ANALYSIS OF ETHICAL DISCOURSE 
 
A. Criticisms of Hipprocratic Medical Ethics 
 
The Oath of Hippocrates states: 
 
                                           
48
 [FN 32] See [FN 8], supra note 15, at 116.  
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I will prescribe regimens for the good of my patients according 
to my ability and my judgment and never do harm to anyone.  I 
will not give a lethal drug to anyone if I am asked, nor will I 
advise such a plan.  In every house where I come I will enter 
only for the good of my patients, keeping myself far from all 
intentional ill-doing.49 
 
In Japan, the remarks of Pompe 50  should also be remembered:  
“Physicians must be aware of their lifework.  Once a person chooses this 
profession, he no longer exists for himself but must exist for the patients.  If 
he is reluctant, he shall choose a different profession.”51 
There are two criticisms on medical ethics that arise from these 
origins.  First, the disease structure is changing in developed countries due to 
the improvement in nutritional and sanitary conditions as well as medical 
care systems.  In Japan, for example, although the primary medical concern 
since the Meiji era52 has long been acute and chronic infectious diseases 
(such as tuberculosis, Hansen’s disease, luetic infection, and acute 
pneumonia), malnutrition, and endemic diseases, these were overcome by 
1960, and attention is shifting to adult and geriatric diseases such as cancer, 
stroke, and cardiac disorder.53 
Because these chronic diseases cannot be cured immediately, 
healthcare today is serving more in the form of symptom management and 
control rather than therapy.  From the viewpoint of a patient, healthcare is a 
way of improving his quality of life because the patient must live with the 
lifelong ailment.  As such, patients now have the right to decide their own 
treatment strategy, and the patient-physician relationship is changing to a 
service requester-consumer-service provider relationship.  Ethical issues 
including the physician-patient relationship are now present as biomedical 
ethics.54  
In the context of patient autonomy and informed consent, physician-
centered healthcare is criticized and the policy suggested by the Hippocratic 
Oath, where the physician’s attitude in unilaterally providing care in a self-
                                           
49
 [FN 33] HIPPOCRATES, VOLUME 1 579 (Shinichirō Ōtsuki ed., Enterprise, Inc. 1988). 
50
 [FN 34] Pompe is the founder of Nagasaki Medical School, and is known in Japan as the father of 
modern western medicine. 
51
 [FN 35] See Nagasaki Medical School Homepage, http://www.med.nagasaki-u.ac.jp (last visited 
Oct. 7, 2010). 
52
 Translator’s note: The Meiji era extended from 1868 to 1912.  
53
 [FN 36] TAKESHI KAWAKAMI, TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCEMENT AND HEALTHCARE COSTS 124, 
163-65 (Keisoubunbō 1986).  
54
 [FN 37] AKIHIRA KOMEMOTO, REVOLUTIONARY STATE-OF-THE-ART MEDICINE 7-13 (Chūkō 
Shinsho 1988). 
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righteous manner based solely on his or her medical knowledge and skills, is 
especially criticized as Hippocratic paternalism.55, 56 
The second criticism is reflected in changes in social awareness.  
While the Hippocratic Oath states that a physician has a nonmaleficence 
obligation, in which he or she must not do any harm to anyone (“primum 
non nocere”), and a beneficence obligation, in which he or she must actively 
do good to everyone, and many professional ethics guidelines adopt these 
principles, there are criticisms that too few people within the medical 
profession actually believe that these principles are merely a code of ethics 
within the small group of medical association, that these principles fail to 
consider patient perspectives from an external point of view, and that the 
collision between these principles, the theory of patient autonomy, and 
informed consent may trigger the medical paternalism criticism.57 
 
B. Regarding the Rule of Information Sharing 
 
The criticisms mentioned above58 also apply to the rule of information 
sharing, which is one of the rules provided by the code of medical ethics.  
Indeed, as the Geneva Oath of the World Medical Association provides, 
since physicians have the duty of providing the best care to their patients, 
they should be able to freely choose the best method of medical care.  
However, criticisms based solely on the fact that patenting of medical 
methods would take away this freedom lack social considerations.  
The patent system aims to encourage innovation by granting 
monopoly rights with a limited term [to the inventor], and with improvement 
in technology, the patent system ultimately provides benefits to the public.  
Thus, the problematic situation is where the duty of the physician conflicts 
with this social benefit.  
Let us consider the situation of medical research where humans are 
the subjects of experiment.  In such a situation, there would inevitably be a 
conflict between the obligation of the physician, which is to provide the best 
medical care to the patient, and the obligation of the researcher, which is to 
improve medical care for the benefit of the future public.  Would it be 
possible to adhere to the Geneva Oath under such circumstances?  Article 2 
                                           
55
 [FN 38] KAZUMASA HOSHINO, ETHICS OF MEDICINE 73 (Iwanami Shinsho 1991). 
56
 Translator’s note: Hippocratic paternalism means “having the physician do what he or she thought 
was best for the patient.”  Robert M. Veatch, Autonomy’s Temporary Triumph, 14(5) HASTINGS CENTER 
REP. 38-40 (1984).  
57
 [FN 39] See [FN 27] BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 42, at 7. 
58
 Translator’s note: See supra Part III.A. 
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of the Nuremberg Code provides, “The experiment [involving human 
subjects] should be such as to yield fruitful results for the good of society, 
unprocurable by other methods or means of study, and not random and 
unnecessary in nature.”59  As such, the Nuremberg Code implies that the 
duty of providing the best care to patients must yield to social benefits.60  
Under the condition that the patent system gives equal opposition 
between the goal of providing benefits to the future public and the expense 
of disadvantage for the current public, the rule of information sharing is not 
necessarily absolute and thus should not be the basis for rejecting patent 
protection of medical methods.  The problem is the legitimacy of the patent 
system from a public policy standpoint; it is not with the code of medical 
ethics within medical associations. 
 
C. Regarding the Sociol-Ethical Theory 
 
The assertion that patent protection of medical methods is against 
social ethics can also be rephrased as having no social justification.  Besides 
ethical considerations, justification of law and public policy requires 
accounting for other factors such as cultural pluralism, political processes, 
and experimental data.  In contrast, the objective of ethical principles is to 
solely provide moral guidance on every act an individual would take.  Thus, 
even if an act is morally correct, the law that encourages such an act may not 
necessarily be correct.  For example, the assertion that active euthanasia is 
morally justified does not conflict with the government’s assertion that this 
practice should be legally banned because it would be difficult to regulate 
the abuse once a ban is signed into a law.  However, ethical notions are used 
to provide moral considerations for policy-making and legislative processes 
as well as judicial decisions.61  (As in this article, it is not meaningless to 
take ethical considerations for problems regarding the patent system.) 
If a system uses patents to restrict physicians or laymen from freely 
using medical methods or to put physicians in a dilemma, then based on the 
principle of ethics, can we still say such a system is justified?  In this 
situation, it becomes necessary to balance the disadvantages from such a 
patent system with the social benefit that it could provide.  The question is 
whether the technological advancement and industrial development from 
                                           
59
 Translator’s note: Nuremburg Code (1947); Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg 
Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10, Vol. 2, 181-82 (1949), available at 
http://ohsr.od.nih.gov/guidelines/nuremberg.html. 
60
 [FN 40] See [FN 27] BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 42, at 319-20. 
61
 [FN 41] See [FN 27] BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 42, at 7-9. 
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such a patent system could outweigh the disadvantage for physicians and 
laymen trying to use the medical methods.  There is no doubt that this 
question can be answered for other areas of technology even if the 
technology relates to emerging life and safety issues, but it is not the case 
when the technology involves medical methods.  Some point out that no 
restriction has really been imposed, and that problems could be resolved by 
providing legal redress. 62   Others point out that since physicians could 
become liable for infringing patents on medical products, it is meaningless 
to distinguish products from methods.63  
 
D. Regarding Increase in Medical Costs 
 
This problem relates to how we think about the principle of justice.  
Let us consider it from the viewpoints of utilitarian justice, liberal justice, 
and egalitarian justice.  
From the utilitarian point of view, justice is realized as long as the 
majority has achieved happiness.  Thus, even if the cost of medical care 
increases due to patenting of medical methods, justice is still realized 
because the increase of healthcare cost is only partial and temporary.  If 
viewed in the long term, the resulting technological advancement would 
bring much benefit and happiness to the people.  
From the liberal point of view, justice does not exist as the result of 
enhanced public benefit; rather, it exists in allowing a fair course of action 
without confinement.  If a person in a free market can distribute wealth 
based on his or her free will without any restriction, then justice is 
considered realized.  It would not be considered problematic if the 
fluctuations of healthcare costs were due to the market principles.  Rather, 
the meaning of justice would be misled if the market were interfered with for 
the purpose of achieving justice. 
Egalitarian justice is divided into equality of result and equality of 
opportunity.  However, since the ability of each individual is different, it is 
impossible to achieve equality of result, and we can only be satisfied with 
equal opportunity.  If people are ensured with equal opportunity to satisfy 
their basic health needs with an appropriate standard of care, justice is 
considered achieved, even if some people seek better services such as 
                                           
62
 [FN 42] See Rainer Moufang, Methods of Medical Treatment Under Patent Law, 24 INT’L REV. 
INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 18, 47-49 (1993). 
63
 [FN 43] See Patent Protection of Medical Methods in MODERN DEVELOPMENT IN INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW AND COMPETITION LAW, IN MEMORY OF PROFESSOR NOBUO MONYA 167, 182-83 (2006). 
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luxurious hospital rooms and expensive dental treatment because they can 
afford them.  
When considering the justification of public policy, there may be 
hesitation in focusing heavily on only one of the above justice theories.  If 
the ideal is to have the right to receive the minimum necessary healthcare, 
then as long as this right is not taken away, services beyond such needs may 
be left to market principles and justice could be achieved in the most 
realistic sense.64  
Under this perspective, because the increase in healthcare cost is due 
to the novel patented invention on medical care, access to healthcare for 
fulfilling basic health needs is not necessarily encumbered and an increase in 
costs should not be the reason to prevent justifying patent protection of 
medical methods.  
 
E. Regarding Patient Privacy 
 
The patients’ right of privacy is based on the principle of self-
autonomy—it serves as a wall to protect patients from having their 
information disclosed and accessed.65   
Physicians have the duty to maintain secretly any information 
obtained in a physician-patient relationship and cannot disclose such 
information to a third party without the patient’s consent.66  
However, this right is not absolute.  For example, if a patient receiving 
psychological treatment tells the doctor that he or she plans to kill someone, 
the doctor would have difficulty deciding whether he or she should breach 
his or her duty and inform the police and the potential victim.  Accordingly, 
the patient’s privacy right and the physician’s duty to maintain secrecy are 
recognized under the condition that there is no other bigger obligation to 
protect.67  
Then, how about in a situation of patent infringement?  Would the 
patient’s privacy right and the physician’s duty to maintain secrecy fall back 
for enforcing patent rights?  This is a difficult question.  
However, since judicial proceedings are equipped with confidentiality 
orders (Patent Act Article 105, Sections 4-6, Article 200, Section 2, Section 
201, etc.) to prevent the leaking of trade secrets for the duration of the 
lawsuit, privacy rights should not be a problem. 
                                           
64
 [FN 44] See [FN 27] BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 42, at 230-50. 
65
 [FN 45] See id. at 296. 
66
 [FN 46] See id. at 303-04. 
67
 [FN 47] See id. at 305-12. 




F. Regarding Physician-Patient Autonomy 
 
Physicians and patients select medical methods based on various 
conditions, such as insurance and financial capability, which affect their 
decision-making processes.  Therefore, even if a patent affects their 
decision-making processes, it is merely an addition to the already existing 
conditions.  Given this perspective, patent protection of medical methods 
would not strongly affect the physician-patient autonomy.68  
 
G. Regarding Honesty between Physician and Patient 
 
Besides the duty of honesty to patients, physicians also have other 
contractual obligations with the hospital and in other social relationships.  
These obligations may conflict with their obligation to remain honest with 
patients.  Consequently, as mentioned in the autonomy section above,69 even 
if additional obligations arise in patent licensing and other contracts related 
to the patent, honesty between physicians and patients is not enough to be 
regarded as a problem.70 
 
H. Regarding the Non-Industrial Medicine Theory 
 
Because my analysis above is based on ethical theories, it is no longer 
appropriate to take the viewpoint of the Hippocratic Oath, which vaguely 
defines medicine.  
As such, the opinion that the development of medical methods occurs 
in universities with public funds and is different from the development of 
medical products which are conducted in private companies for profit, and 
that the development of medical methods is not necessarily “industrial” 
because it does not involve the incentive of obtaining patent protection 
becomes problematic.  
The problem from a biomedical ethical point of view is how to 
distribute the limited resources and to which area of healthcare to distribute 
such resources.  In other words, when public funds are limited, which 
medical field should receive the funds?  Beauchamp argues that in such 
circumstances, funds should be allocated to areas such as kidney dialysis, 
                                           
68
 [FN 48] See [FN 29], supra note 44, at 1152-54. 
69
 Translator’s note: See supra Part III.F. 
70
 [FN 49] See [FN 30], supra note 45, at Section II.C. 
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kidney transplantation, and heart transplantation.71  Accordingly, distributive 
justice and even utilitarian justice cannot be achieved without a detailed 
cost-benefit analysis, and the problem is clearly quite difficult.  
However, this problem could be avoided if we let market principles 
take care of where to invest, and justice could be achieved from a 
libertarianism standpoint.  To illustrate this point, George J. Annas, 
criticizing the patenting of surrogate embryo transfer (“SET”), introduces 
the statement made by Dr. John Buster, the team leader of SET:  “But for 
private investor financing, he [Buster] maintains, he would not have been 
able to do the research that led to SET since NIH [National Institute of 
Health] would not fund the research, and he could not charge private 
patients.”72 
Healthcare needs have diversified according to the change in disease 
structure, as discussed above in Section A.  Resource allocation based on 
market principles is considered justified in areas where governmental funds 
cannot be counted.  Essentially, it is the same basis as having private security 
firms in addition to police, and having private schools in addition to public 
schools.73  Therefore, medicine should be approved as being industrial.  
 
IV. PLACEMENT OF ETHICAL HURDLES IN THE PATENT ACT 
 
A. Argument of Systematic Positioning 
 
As discussed above from the biomedical ethics point of view, ethical 
obstacles facing patent protection of medical methods are reduced to the 
problem of finding social justifications.  
The Patent Act achieves utilitarian justice by granting a monopoly 
right with a limited term for inventions that would enhance technological 
advancement and industrial development.  In other words, information on 
technological ideas, which at its natural state would immediately enter the 
public domain, is artificially made personal property by equipping it with the 
principle of exclusion.  As a result, the information is made tradable in a free 
market, distributed optimally and produced maximally through the principle 
of free market, and thereby achieves utilitarian justice.  Additionally, 
because such a result is achieved through the principle of free market, liberal 
justice is achieved as well.  
                                           
71
 [FN 50] See [FN 27] BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 42, at 250-59. 
72
 [FN 51] See [FN 26], supra note 41, at 25. 
73
 [FN 52] SUSUMU MORIMURA, HOW FAR COULD FREEDOM EXTEND —INTRODUCTION TO 
LIBERATARIANISM 114 (Kōdansha Gendai Shinsho 2001). 
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Accordingly, although when such bases of justification is rejected, in 
situations where results of technological advancement and industrial 
development are not achieved, or where utilitarian justice and liberal justice, 
as discussed above, collide with the justification based on some other 
principles, that the ethical issues surrounding medical methods are not 
limited to only these situations.  
However, there are still some points left to be mentioned regarding the 
non-industrial medicine theory because it is possible that there may be 
technologies that would not result in industrial development.  For example, 
in contrast to what I have discussed above, if medical advancement resulting 
from public investment actually leads to the development of the medical 
industry and yet it does not become socially justified, then we must reserve a 
backup for rejecting patent protection of medical methods by asserting that it 
does not fall in the category of industry.  
Given this point, it seems that it is meaningful to save some room for 
deciding whether medicine is industry under the industrial applicability 
requirement theory. 
If we take the special reason theory in which the special reason has no 
relationship with the industrial applicability requirement theory, however, 
then it is difficult to explain why the patent system cannot be justified.  
Therefore, it is more appropriate to consider the positioning of these ethical 
issues in the patent system under the industrial applicability requirement 
theory. 
 
B. Upstream or Downstream System? 
 
The next question is whether the system should be upstream or 
downstream when deciding whether patent protection should be given to 
medical methods under the industrial applicability requirement theory.  
In an upstream system, patent protection is denied when the system 
determines that an invention cannot be applied industrially.  In other words, 
the patent application would be rejected when it has been determined that 
the invention would not lead to industrial development or is limited in areas 
that do not aim for industrial development.  However, it is questionable 
whether such decision-making is possible.  Even if such a decision was 
made during the examination process, the system may not be able to deal 
with the change in the industry structure later on, and thus may omit some 
important technologies from protection.  
In contrast, such a problem may be avoided in a downstream system.  
Even if a patent exists on inventions with no industrial applicability, while 
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the patent rights have no effect in areas of industrial development, they 
could have some effect in other areas.  
Accordingly, it seems necessary to add new provisions in Article 69 of 
the Patent Act to limit the effectiveness of patent rights. However, patent 
rights are basically only to be “enforced as industry” (Patent Act Article 68).  
“Enforcement as industry” does not mean personal or domestic 
enforcement; 74  it should be interpreted to mean business and industrial 
enforcement.  As such, it becomes possible to reject the protection of 
inventions that would involve no business and industrial enforcement of 
patent rights.  Further, such interpretation of “enforcement as industry” 
would not only lead to more flexible responses to distinct cases but also 
would allow a more clear distinction between patent protection and non-
protection in a downstream system. 
 
C. Importance of the Key Word “Industry” 
 
As discussed above, ethical issues surrounding the patent system 
should be viewed from the standpoint of whether the patent system could be 
socially justified and whether it would lead to industrial development.  
Therefore, the elements of “industry” are important and should be kept in 
mind when considering patentability requirements as well as limitations of 
patent rights enforcement.  I believe these are the α and the ω of the Patent 
Act.75 
                                           
74
 [FN 53] See [FN 8], supra note 15, at 311. 
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 Translator’s note: α refers to “alpha” and ω refers to “omega.”  In other words, because the 
elements of “industry” are the most essential part of the Japanese patent law, they should always be kept in 
mind when considering patentability requirements and the limitations of patent rights enforcement.   
